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its amendment the only aim of the Widow Remarrying Statute has
been to protect the children of the former marriage, and its effectiveness
in this capacity can be seriously questioned. The Act seems to overlook
altogether the possibility-and a fairly strong one if the cases are a
criterion-that a widow might ally herself with an improvident spouse.
And, if her children are minors, she has no recourse to the property from
her first marriage, a potentially valuable asset, to make provision for
them. Added to this is the prospect that in such an eventuality either she
or the guardian might be compelled to dispose of the children's two thirds
share of their father's property for their provision simply to preserve
for them the uncertain right of descent in their mother's one third.
To argue that the children should not be afforded further benefit
from the restraint provision is not necessarily to propose that their right
of descent under the old statute is, or ought to be, similarly ended. It will
be seen, however, that what is left is insubstantial at best and susceptible
of being handily defeated by any inter vivos conveyance.
THE EFFECT OF THE PALSGRAF DOCTRINE IN INDIANA
The development of negligence as a basis for tort liability epitomizes
the growth of socio-economic policies. Originally, the common law action
of trespass to the person imposed absolute liability for all damage directly
caused by a defendant's behavior.' Everyone owed an absolute duty not
to harm the person or property of another. If an injury occurred, there
was a breach of duty, and liability was imposed. However, judges realized
that to promote private enterprise liability then imposed for pure accident
would have to be tempered.2 Accordingly, courts began to require some
fault on a defendant's part before holding him liable for a plaintiff's
1. ". . . [It should be noted that this ancient concept of trespass had reference to
any contact achieved as the consequence of one's conduct against the interest of another,
no matter under what circumstances it occurred, as long as the defendant's causative
conduct was his voluntary act." Gregory, Trespass To Negligence To Absolute Liability,
37 VA. L. REv. 359, 362 (1951). Professor Gregory indicates that there was no right of
action for nontrespassory acts; e.g., when one left a timber on the highway which
caused a traveler to trip and be injured, no cause of action accrued. Then, trespass on the
case was developed to provide a remedy for such injuries. Although this gave a remedy
where there previously was none, plaintiffs had to show some fault on the defendant's
part to recover; they had merely to show injury to prevail in a trespass action.
2. ". . . [M]any of our judges believed that the development of this young country
under a system of private enterprise would be hindered and delayed as long as the element
of chance exposed enterprisers to liability for the consequences of pure accident, without
fault of some sort. And this point of view became manifest in several state court de-
cisions a little more than a century ago." Id. at 365.
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injuries.' Thus, the fault principle, known today as negligence, gave rise
to the complex tort for unintended harm.
It developed that to recover damages for a negligently inflicted
injury, five elements must be proved: damage, actual causation, duty,
breach of duty, and proximate cause." The first two elements would
also have been required under the old common law action for trespass.
Responsibility, however, was limited, from an absolute duty not to injure
another's person or property, to a duty to refrain from committing
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.' Though
thus restricted, the duty is still owed to the world at large.6
However, even when one breaches this broad duty, it is generally
agreed that he should not be liable for all harms that result.' Causa
proxima, non reimota, spectatur was early adopted by courts as a limita-
tion on liability. Through use of this notion, sometimes termed legal
cause, courts fulfill the need for restricting liability of negligent de-
fendants in order to foster industry and safeguard the individual. Judge
Andrews frankly defined proximate cause when he said: ". . . [B] ecause
of convenience, of public policy, or a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
It is not logic. It is practical politics."' In the application of this principle,
courts and jurors are guided by experience gleaned from their environ-
ment; thus, a just outcome determined by community standards is sought.
Unfortunately, difficulties in application arose when the proximate
cause principle was utilized, for courts began to incorporate the other four
elements of a negligence case in their charges on proximate cause.' Duty
3. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
4. For a detailed study of these elements under proximate cause and the risk theory,
see Foster, The Risk Theory and Proximate Cause-A Comparative Study, 32 NEB. L.
Rxv. 72 (1952).
5. Judge Andrews has stated the traditional proximate cause approach in the clearest
terms possible. Consequently, his dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R.,
248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928), will be used as an example of the analysis
and treatment given to a negligence case under the traditional approach.
6. Ibid.
7. "There is still the problem of an end to liability, of a place to stop. It is still
unthinkable that anyone shall be liable to the end of time for all the results that follow
in endless sequence from his single act." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mico. L. av.
1, 24 (1953). See also Fleming and Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 784 (1951).
8. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
(dissent).
9. ". . . '[P]roxima causa' captured the imagination of the courts, and by its
promise of easy decision has led them upon evil days. . . . Having no integrated mean-
ing of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be substituted for any one of the ele-
ments of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes difficult. . . . The
inability to identify its meaning for sure renders it immune to effectual argument."
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471 (1950). See also
PROSSER, ToRTs 186 (1941).
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was so broadly defined that it was often assumed, and judges sent cases
to the jury on the proximate cause issue with instructions which required
them to draw an "uncertain and wavering line" some place in the series
of events."0 In effect, such a charge is an invitation to the jury to give
free rein to their dictates of conscience and emotion." Consequently,
cases decided on the theory of proximate cause became a confusing mix-
ture of the several elements of negligence plus numerous and complex
public policy considerations. To locate the decisive factor upon which
liability was predicated in such circumstances is extremely difficult, for
such a witches' brew of variables impedes analysis.
Attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of proximate cause
by using other equally vague phrases, such as "efficient cause,"12 "natural
and probable,' 3 "natural and proximate," 4 and "efficient and predomi-
nating."'" However, the criterion most frequently -employed is foresee-
ability; i.e., liability will not attach if a reasonable man could not have
foreseen some harm to some person."0 Unfortunately, this requirement is
so vague that it does not materially aid clarification of the phrase, proxi-
mate cause. Further, consideration of foreseeability under the proximate
cause element of a negligence action results in a duplication of effort, for
the determinations to be made here are identical with those made under
the duty element where it must have been ascertained whether or not the
alleged misconduct unreasonably threatened the safety of others.
While most courts were becoming more deeply mired in the con-
fusion of proximate cause, Judge Cardozo developed a new approach to
the problem of limiting liability. In the famous Palsgraf case he enunci-
ated the risk theory in its matured form." Cardozo redefined the essential
elements of a tort action so that: A defendant is negligent when a
reasonable man could have perceived that the proposed conduct would
10. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928)
(dissent) ; Tabor v. Continental Baking Co., 110 Ind. App. 633, 643, 38 N.E.2d 257, 261
(1941).
11. See SEAVEY, COGITA'SONS ON TORTS 33 (1954).
12. Sarber v. Indianapolis, 72 Ind. App. 594, 610, 126 N.E. 330, 334 (1920).
13. Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Charmin, 161 Ind. 95, 104, 67 N.E. 923, 927 (1903).
14. Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Lowder, 7 Ind. App. 537, 546, 34 N.E. 447, 450 (1893).
15. Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 353 (1884). Difficulty with this
type of test was early bemoaned in Indiana. Binford v. Johnston, 83 Ind. 426, 428 (1882).
16. Knouff v. Logansport, 26 Ind. App. 202, 206, 59 N.E. 347, 349 (1901) ; Indiana
Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. McMath, 26 Ind. App. 154, 157, 57 N.E. 593 (1900);
-Ohio & M. Ry. v. Trowbridge, 126 Ind. 391, 395, 26 N.E. 64, 65 (1890).
17. "The risk reasonably to be perceived lefines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation. . . " Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99,
100 (1928) (emphasis added). Cardozo's redefinition of the duty had the effect of limit-
ing a defendant's liability much as had the earlier redefinition of the absolute duty owed
under trespass.
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create an unreasonable risk of a certain type of harm"8 to a specific class
of persons 9 (duty) and the defendant so conducted himself (breach
of duty) causing (actual causation) injury of the type and to a person of
the class that was endangered' (damage).2 Proximate cause is foreign
to this theory,2 ' for the furthest limit of liability is set by the risk reason-
ably to be perceived.2 2 Once the duty is defined, so is the extent of
liability.
18. The harm risked when A gives B, an infant, a stick of dynamite is that of
explosion and resulting injury. If B strikes a playmate with the dynamite and causes
injury, A should not be liable. He did not create an unreasonable risk of the type of
harm that occurred any more than if he had given B a toy of the same size. The un-
reasonable risk which was created did not mature, and the resulting harm was outside
that risk. Not only must the risk be unreasonable, but it must be such as to a certain
type of harm.
Also, the type of harm is pertinent in determining whether or not contributory neg-
ligence is present. For example, if X's employer tells him not to go on a loading plat-
form because he may slip on the ice covering it, and X goes onto the platform and is
injured when a wall falls on him, X is not contributorily negligent. That is, he contri-
buted only to the foreseeable risk of slipping on the ice and not to the risk that the wall
would fall. This is a type of harm outside the risk. Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 59
Conn. 261, 21 Atl. 924 (1890). See Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of
Torts, 7 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 468, 469 (1932).
19. The duty owed is considered to be relational to a certain class of persons. This
obviates any duty to the world at large and narrows the duty to those persons foreseeably
endangered. For example, if A gives a gun to B, an infant, and B later presents it to C,
his thirty year old brother, who carelessly fires it and is injured, A should not be liable
for C's injury. While A created a risk to B and those B may injure, A did not create
a risk that C would negligently shoot himself; he is a person outside the risk created.
While A did create an unreasonable risk, it terminated when the gun was delivered to a
responsible person.
"A duty to use care extends only to those who may be harmed; a breach of duty to
one person is not of itself the basis for liability to another person. There is liability only
to those within the circle of risk." Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HxAv. L. REV. 72, 92
(1942). See Foster, supra note 4, at 92; PRossER, ToRTs 182-188 (1941).
20. HAR'ER, TORTS §73 (1933) ; PRossER, TORTS §31 (1941).
21. "Thus, in most cases we should be able to avoid the esoteric meaning contained
in the phrases 'proximate cause' or 'legal cause' and ask simply whether or not the plain-
tiff was one of those endangered by defendant's act, and if so whether the harmful
event was one which was at least not unexpectable. In other words, in most cases the
reason for making a person liable for negligence gives the limits of liability." SEAVEY,
op. cit. stpra note 11, at 32.
22. If A unreasonably creates a risk of harm to B, but no reasonable man could
foresee any harm to X, yet X is injured as a result of A's act, there would be no liability
under the risk theory because A did not breach any duty owed to X. A was not negligent
as to X. Under the traditional approach the duty is broader. Since A acted unreasonably
as to B, A breached his duty to the world and was negligent. It seems unrealistic to
consider an act negligent unless it is relative to certain protected interests. Cardozo
referred to the traditional proposition as "negligence in the air." Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). However, though A is considered negligent,
he may be exonerated because his act was not the proximate cause of X's injury. Con-
versely, if B had been injured as a result of the unreasonable risk created by A, A would
be liable under the risk concept. While A would be considered negligent under the tradi-
tional approach, he could escape liability if the court held his act was not the proximate
cause of the harm. Because of the inexact nature of the proximate cause element and
the latitude it allows a jury, it is difficult to predict what will happen when a case must
be decided on this issue.
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The risk theory restricts the duty owed to the world at large by requir-
ing that an act must not create an unreasonable risk of a certain type of
harm to a specific class of individuals. To determine when a risk is
unreasonable, the social utility of permitting a particular activity must
be balanced against the social detriment it may entail." The likelihood
of injury and the ease of abating the risk also weigh in a determination
of reasonableness.
The necessity for careful analysis of the defendant's duty is chief
among the advantages of the risk theory. Breakdown of the duty as to
reasonableness of risk and person and harm within it permits the critical
issue to be spot-lighted. Therefore, as precedent, the case is more meaning-
ful because it can be interpreted in relation to one of these factors. In
deciding the reasonableness of the risk, the significant public policy con-
siderations should be forthrightly expressed and not obscured in equivocal
terminology. Instruction to the jury in terms of risk is easier and more
understandable than those of proximate cause for the former, more
familiar, term conveys some meaning to the jury.24 The jurors by necess-
ity draw on experience to reach a decision, as they do under proximate
cause, but the issues are the defined factors of the risk theory; thus, their
verdict is more significant than when a result of the impenetrable morass
of proximate cause.2" Consequently, results are more predictable than
23. "The existence of negligence can be found by evaluating the interests of the
parties in the light of the welfare of the entire community. On the one side is the value
to the community of what the defendant is doing; on the other, the interest which it has
in not having harm occur. When the first is great, permissible conduct includes great
risks." SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 27.
What is unreasonable today may not be so in fifty years, and what is unreasonable in
New York may not be in Utah. "When the first railroad was sued for damages in
Bavaria, the court decided for the plaintiff because 'The operation of a railroad neces-
sarily presupposes a negligent act.' And when the first 'wealthy hoodlum' set his auto-
mobile on an American road, the law all but came to hold him liable for his 'devil wagon'
as for a ferocious animal." Ehrenzweig, A Psych oanalysis of Negligence, 47 NORTa-
WESTERN L. REV. 855, 863 (1953). However, as civilization advanced, though the dangers
coincident with the use of the automobile weighed heavily, it was of such great utility
that society condoned automotive travel despite the constant risk of danger.
Cardozo told how a judge weighs interests %vhen he said: ". . . [H]e must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in
brief, from life itself." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocss 113 (1921).
24. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REv. 372, 389
(1939). Foster, supra note 4, at 85.
25. "May it not be that whereas the long sought 'system' of tort law, not discovered
in the artificialities of procedure and forms of action, nor yet in the logical organization
of doctrinal generalizations, may yet be found in a few comparatively simple formula-
tions of social policy which seem consciously and unconsciously, to have pushed the judges
in the right direction for these many centuries. If such a formulation of somewhat
general notions of social policy can be made, it seems pretty clear that the general con-
cept of the foreseeability of harm, the idea of a general threat to a general class of
persons, will occupy a conspicuous place in the rational organization of tort law." Harper,
supra note 18, at 482.
626
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under the traditional approach.26
The appropriate and logical place for a consideration of public policy
in a negligence case is in relation to the duty owed certain plaintiffs.
Under the traditional approach it is a manifest contradiction to hold
that a duty to the world has been breached, yet exonerate the defendant
because of public policy. In effect, the court determines that, although
there is a breach of duty, the defendant has committed no actionable
wrong. It is far more logical to include consideration of public policy
with the determination of the defendant's duty. If for public policy
reasons liability must be restricted, then his conduct in the light of all
circumstances is not unreasonable to any plaintiff.2" As life in modem
"But the fact that as a mere matter of straight thinking analysis it is more helpful to
think about the foreseeable range and source of danger as limits upon duty rather than
limits upon causal connection in no way shows that these questions therefore become
more difficult or less appropriate for the jury." Fleming, Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 NORTHWESTERN L. REv. 778, 814 (1953).
26. "The result sought by Cardozo, Andrews, and all the others is a formula which
with a fair degree of definiteness will mark the boundary between liability and non-
liability in negligence cases." Seavey, supra note 24, at 382.
"The risk theory is easier of application and more readily understood. In most cases
it is not difficult to determine the kind of harm which was foreseeable and the persons
who were within the danger zone. To be sure, the risk theory is not a panacea, and in
some cases there will be doubt as to the area of risk, but in most cases there will be
general agreement, as distinguished from the certain uncertainty of proximate cause."
Foster, supra note 4, at 101. But see Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH. L. Rzv. 1, 19
(1953).
"It is quite true that even this does not always give a definite result; there are still
many doubtful cases. . . . In any event, this method of appraisal appears to be an advance
over the older phrases which seem to be completely meaningless." SEAvEY, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 34.
27. Under the risk theory, liability should extend to the limit of the unreasonable,
foreseeable risk and no further. Public policy by necessity determines what is reasonable
and unreasonable. It is claimed that in certain cases liability is cut short of the fore-
seeable risk. In water utility cases, for instance, where fire causes damage that could
have been avoided had adequate water pressure been furnished, some courts are un-
willing to impose liability on the water company. Fitch v. Seymour Water Co., 139 Ind.
214, 37 N.E. 982 (1894) ; Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928), accord, Larimore v. Indianapolis Water Co., 197 Ind. 457, 151 N.E. 333 (1926).
However, it seems plainly foreseeable that if pressure is inadequate, such a harm could
occur. Apparently, the reluctance of the courts to so extend liability is due to a fear of
imposing staggering burdens on public utilities. On the other hand, nonliability in this
type of case may make water companies lax in maintaining their facilities. For instance,
in April, 1954, the first check in nineteen years was made on the maximum fire-fighting
capabilities of the Indianapolis water supply. Indianapolis Star, April 21, 1954, §1, p. 11,
col. 2. It is significant that in those jurisdictions where liability is imposed, water
companies still exist. Nevertheless, in some cases an overpowering public policy reaton
restricts liability short of the foreseeable risk. In this situation the court is holding
that society does not consider the defandant's acts unreasonable, though the harm may
be foreseeable.
A similar situation occurs in cases concerning a negligent act which causes mental
anguish. Unless there is a concurrent physical injury, courts generally deny recovery.
Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933) ; Vandalia Coal Co. v.
Yemm, 175 Ind. 524, 92 N.E. 49 (1910) ; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
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society grows more complex and knowledge increases, the concepts of
unreasonable and foreseeable risk must also progress,28 and contemporary
judges and jurors are the means by which it should expand and grow. 9
Under the risk theory, foreseeability is employed to ascertain the type
of harm and class of persons within the risk created by the defendant's
act. This is commendable,3" for he should be liable only to the extent a
reasonable man could perceive a risk of harm to the plaintiff. Such
reasoning is seemingly in accord with the underlying theory of negligence
since one should act at his peril only with regard to what is foreseeable.
Any damage incurred beyond that is merely accidental.
Thus, the traditional proximate cause approach and the risk theory
can be distinguished in the abstract. While the former may limit liability
by exonerating a negligent defendant because he did not proximately
cause the harm, the latter narrowly defines duty, rendering the defendant
liable only for injuries to individuals within its scope. However, in
App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900). This can be explained on grounds that mental anguish is
not regarded as a type of damage compensable at law. However, Indiana courts do allow
recovery solely for mental anguish when it is caused by a wilful act. Kline v. Kline, 158
Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902) ; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12
N.E.2d 360 (1938). The difficulty of proof and uncertainty of damages are practical
reasons for refusing relief. Where mental anguish caused by a negligent act results in
a physical manifestation of injury, this difficulty does not exist, and there seems to be no
valid reason for denying recovery. When one enters a course of conduct that creates a
risk of harm to a person, he should foresee that mental as well as physical injury may
be inflicted. To limit recovery to physical injuries, and thereby deny compensation for
mental anguish resulting in physical injury, is to restrict liability short of the foreseeable
risk. Here again, however, when a court determines that public policy will not permit
recovery for this damage, it is consistent with the risk theory to hold that the defendant's
activity did not create an unreasonable risk of that type of harm.
These are two areas where courts generally have found it advisable to restrict lia-
bility because of public policy reasons. In both cases a foreseeable risk of harm was
created, but it may appear that it was not an unreasonable risk in the light of public policy.
When this is the decisive factor, the courts should clearly state it.
28. "The fact is that a century or more ago, the failure to guard against dangers
that ought to be foreseen was treated in the same spirit as now; what has changed in the
accelerated pace and the enhanced mechanism utilized by society is merely the range and
scope of the danger to be guarded against. The law of tort is more 'liberal' precisely
because experience shows more predictable casualties." McPartland v. State, 277 App.
Div. 103, 98 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (1950).
29. An example of a commendable expansion in this area has occurred in situations
involving railroad engine collisions with objects at crossings which result in debris being
thrown against a nearby plaintiff. In 1900, the appellate court held that an injury oc-
curring in such a manner could not be anticipated. Evansville & T. H. Ry. v. Welch, 25
Ind. App. 308, 58 N.E. 88 (1900). In 1929, the court held to the contrary and allowed
the plaintiff to recover. Robinson v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ind. App. 167, 166 N.E. 160(1929). In a similar situation, where the engine was exceeding the speed limit, the
court reversed a directed verdict for the railroad holding that it could reasonably have
anticipated such an injury. McIntosh v. Pennsylvania R.R., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d
263 (1941).
30. "Prima facie at least, the reasons for creating liability should limit it." Seavey,
supra note 24, at 386.
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practice, courts have seemed to combine these two rationales, though
ostensibly most judicial decisions are reasoned in terms of proximate
cause." Through foreseeability, as employed under the proximate cause
concept, courts tend to analyze negligence cases by considering elements
peculiar to the risk theory and in this manner have effected a combination
of the two principles. 2
Indiana has frequently stated its negligence theory in definite causa-
tion terms. Swanson v. Slagel" set down a dual standard for determining
liability by requiring the defendant's act to be a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the injury and by applying the test of foreseeability. Apparently,
when a court imposes the first of these requisites, it determines whether
or not the act is the actual cause of the harms ;" foreseeability is used to
ascertain the proximate cause. 5 Thus, foreseeability is not merely one
means of determining proximate cause; it has become an essential test in
Indiana."
In the Swanson case, instead of merely requiring the usual foresee-
ability of some injury to some person, the court required a determination
of whether the plaintiff's interest was protected against the particular
hazard encountered.17 In terms of the risk theory, this requires that both
the person and the harm be within the scope of the risk created. By
utilizing portions of the risk doctrine in their application of the proximate
31. ". . . [I]n judicial decisions the result is often reached through reasoning in
terms of proximate cause. Indeed, a professional generation ago the 'cause' reasoning
was used almost exclusively. But the problem is not one of cause in any meaningful
sense and the scope of risk analysis has been gaining favor in recent years with both
courts and commentators. It is doubtful whether this trend has made any material change
in sufistantive results, but it has made a tremendous contribution in promoting clarity of
thought." Fleming, supra note 25, at 784. See Fleming and Perry, supra note 7.
32. "An avalanche of decisions by tribunals great and small is producing a situation
where citation of precedent is tending to count for less, and appeal to an informing
principle is tending to count for more." CARnozo, THE GaOWTH OF THE LAW 5 (1924).
33. 212 Ind. 394, 8 N.E.2d 993 (1937).
34. "'Substantial' presumably means much the same thing as 'material,' also an
approved word in Indiana. It apparently has a double significance: 1. that the defend-
ant's negligence contributed in fact to the injury, that is, was at least an important actual
cause, and 2. that there was no unforeseeable intervening force which makes the de-
fendant's negligence unsubstantial or relatively unimportant. If the defendant's negli-
gence is a 'substantial factor' in this sense, it is immaterial that the extent of the injury
or the manner of its occurrence is wholly unforeseeable." Harper, Development in the
Law of Torts in Indiana 1940-45, 21 IND. L.J. 447, 453 (1946).
35. "The result of the holding in the foregoing cases is that if the wrongful act of
the defendant is a substantial factor in producing the injury complained of, and if the
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff is one of a class which was reasonably fore-
seeable at the time of the defendant's misconduct, then there is a casual relation in fact
as well as a legal cause." Swanson v. Slagel, 212 Ind. 394, 413, 8 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (1937).
36. Dalton Foundaries, Inc. v. Jefferies, 114 Ind. App. 271, 51 N.E.2d 13 (1943);
Buddenberg v. Morgan, 110 Ind. App. 609, 38 N.E.2d 287 (1941).
37. Swanson v. Slagel, 212 Ind. 394, 414, 8 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (1937).
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cause concept, Indiana courts are combining the two liability-limiting
theories. 8
Further illustration of this combination is found in Button v. Penn-
sylvania R.R.3 The complaint alleged that the defendant unnecessarily
fired large amounts of coal into its engine causing black smoke to cover
the highway paralleling the railroad. Because of the smoke, the car in
which the plaintiff was riding ran off the road, and struck a utility pole
causing injury to the plaintiff. The court indicated that for the same
consequences resulting from an act necessary to the operation of the engine
there would be no liability. In other words, that was a reasonable risk
that the public had to bear because of the social utility of the railroad's
operation. However, the complaint alleged an unnecessary firing of the
engine which, the tribunal concluded, would subject travelers on the high-
way to unreasonable risks. The court's discussion of proximate cause
involved a determination of whether the harm was one included in the
foreseeable risk." Thus, once again elements of the risk theory were
employed under the proximate cause label.
Other Indiana cases have reached desirable results by considering
the bounds of the circle of risk under the veil of proximate cause. A con-
dition negligently created by the defendant which enables the unintentional
misconduct of a third person to cause injury is often within the risk thus
rendering the defendant liable for the total damage.4 In such a case, he is
held to foresee the negligent acts of third persons. However, when the
risk of injury to the plaintiff is very slight and the negligence of a third
38. Button v. Pennsylvania R.R., 115 Ind. App. 210, 57 N.E.2d 444 (1944) ; Dalton
Foundaries, Inc. v. Jefferies, 114 Ind. App. 271, 51 N.E.2d 13 (1943). In Pitcairn v.
Whiteside, 109 Ind. App. 693, 34 N.E.2d 943 (1941), the court stated: "There was a
duty upon the appellants to refrain from the creation or maintenance of any condition
upon their right of way which subjected the traveling public, using public highways in
the vicinity of such right of way [persons within the risk], to unreasonable risks or con-
ditions that were unnecessarily dangerous. A violation of this duty would constitute
negligence." Id. at 701, 34 N.E.2d at 946. In a consideration of proximate cause the
court looked to the factual cause question. Id. at 702, 34 N.E.2d at 948. The case is
commented on by Harper, supra note 34, at 455.
Though the Palsgraf case has never been cited in Indiana, Tabor v. Continental Bak-
ing Co., 110 Ind. App. 633, 38 N.E.2d 257 (1941), cited a later New York case which
expressly applied the risk theory. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E.
694 (1930). Other cases utilizing elements of the risk approach are: McIntosh v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E. 2d 263 (1941) ; Buddenberg v. Morgan,
110 Ind. App. 609, 38 N.E.2d 287 (1941) ; Daughterty v. Hunt, 110 Ind. App. 264, 38
N.E.2d 250 (1941).
39. 115 Ind. App. 210, 57 N.E.2d 444 (1944).
40. The court classified the harm as a traffic accident which was, therefore, one
that was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 218, 57 N.E.2d at 447.
41. Indianapolis v. Willis, 208 Ind. 607, 194 N.E. 343 (1935) ; McIntosh v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d 263 (1941) ; Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109 Ind. App.
693, 34 N.E.2d, 943 (1941).
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person highly improbable, the harm occurring to the plaintiff caused by
an intervening negligent act may be outside the original risk."' Similarly,
no liability attaches when the original act did not produce a risk of the
occurrence of a wilful or criminal act." Finally, although an unreasonable
risk is created, it may be terminated if a third party could reasonably be
expected to correct the situation."
Whether proximate cause or the risk theory is applied to a particular
set of facts oftentimes occasions little difference in result. However, there
are cases where, like Palsgraf, use of the risk theory would effect a differ-
ent outcome than that arrived at through proximate cause. In Watts v.
Evansville, Mt. Carmel, and Northern Railway two persons were injured
as a consequence of the defendant's actions. The trial court allowed dam-
ages to one plaintiff for his injury because it was foreseeable but denied
recovery to the other, because his was not. In permitting recovery to
both, the appellate court reasoned that if the defendant had acted so as to
avoid the foreseeable injury, the unforeseeable harm would not have
occurred. Such a rationale is founded upon the principle that everyone
owes a duty to the world at large. Thus, if a defendant breaches this duty
as to one person, he is then negligent as to all. On the other hand, the
trial court, by limiting the duty to the foreseeable risk of harm created
by the defendant's act, reached a result in conformity with the risk theory.
Another situation that invites resolution by utilization of the risk
theory was presented in the Prickett case." Company X negligently cut
a decayed telephone pole; later, company Y further weakened it. .Although
the telephone company for some time had actual knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the pole, they instructed an employee to climb it.
He was seriously injured when the pole fell. The court held all three
jointly liable. Yet, it hardly seems possible that Companies X and Y
could foresee any risk of danger to this plaintiff. To do so, they would
have had to anticipate that the telephone company, fully aware of the
danger, would allow the pole to remain in a dangerous condition and, then,
send an employee up the pole. Unquestionably, Companies X and Y
created unreasonable risks to certain protected interests. Should they
have so weakened the pole that it would fall and injure a passer-by or
damage nearby property, the result would be within the risk created. Also,
there might be liability if the lineman climbed the pole before the telephone
42. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Martin, 122 Ind. App. 28, 102 N.E.2d 394 (1951).
43. Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942). This
case is noted by Harper, supra note 34, at 454.
44. Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S.W. 647 (1908).
45. 191 Ind. 27, 129 N.E. 315 (1921).
46. Citizens Telephone Co. v. Prickett, 189 Ind. 141, 125 N.E. 193 (1919).
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company had sufficient time to correct the situation or to inform its
employees. However, this plaintiff seems to have been a person outside
the risk created by companies X and Y; they could foresee no danger to
him. At some point the risk created by them must terminate, and this
point was reached in the Prickett case."
A more recent Indiana case may be criticized in that the court required
too much detail to be foreseen by the defendant, a utility company which
allowed a decayed and unsupported utility pole to remain in use. 8 The
defective pole was connected by utility wires to a second pole 150 feet
away. An automobile was negligently driven against the second pole
causing the decayed one to fall on the plaintiff. The court in considering
the defendant's duty to the plaintiff stated that the "inquiry in the instant
case [is] whether [the defendant] should have anticipated that the driver
of an automobile would negligently drive his car off the traveled portion
of the highway over the curb and into one of its poles with sufficient
force to affect a connecting pole 150 feet away."49 Realistically, however,
a broader question should have been considered, i.e., the risks created by
not replacing a pole in such a decayed condition. It seems obvious that
one possibility of harm implicit in this situation is that the pole may fall
of its own weight and injure a passer-by. With the number of automobiles
in use today, it is reasonable to foresee that a car may collide with a utility
pole. Thus, there is a substantial risk that negligence of a third party
may combine with the dangerous condition and result in injury to nearby
persons. In the instant case, both the person and the harm were within
the risk. Admittedly, the manner in which the harm occurred was im-
probable, but the result was not. Since the risk could h.ve been easily
abated by supporting or replacing the pole, suffering its continuance
would seem unreasonable." Because the utility's negligence was the
47. This case should be compared with Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F.2d 767
(2d Cir. 1932). There the railroad's tugboat negligently damaged a barge. The barge
was towed into the dock safely, but because the sides were then covered with ice, the
bargee did not inspect it to determine the extent of the damage. The barge was loaded
with plaintiff's coal and capsized due to its damaged condition. The railroad was not
held liable for the sinking of the barge or the loss of the coal. Learned Hand stated in
the opinion: ". . . [Tihe breach of a railroad's duty to one class of persons creates no
liability in favor of another." Id. at 770. ". . . [T~he usual test is said to be whether
the damage could be foreseen by the actor when he acted; not indeed the precise train of
events, but similar damage to the same class of persons." Id. at 771. When the railroad
tug damaged the barge, it could not be foreseen that the barge would be towed to shore
and loaded without inspection as to the damage. As to the bargee's neglect, Judge Hand
said: "As a wrong it is irrelevant; as an unlikely event it may be critical." Ibid. (em-
phasis added).
48. Indiana Service Corp. v. Johnston, 109 Ind. App. 204, 34 N.E2d 157 (1941).
49. Id. at 206, 34 N.E.2d at 158.
50. Two other Indiana cases appear to have unduly restricted what was reasonably
foreseeable. Gary v. Struble, 106 Ind. App. 518, 18 N.E.2d 465 (1936); Wilcox v.
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actual cause of the injury, liability would attach under the risk theory ;"
however, under the proximate cause concept, the court held that no
reasonable man could have anticipated this result.
The courts' tendency to combine the two liability-limiting principles
is especially apparent in certain types of cases. Indiana statutory negli-
gence decisions are pervaded with proximate cause language,52 but clearly
the reasoning of the risk theory is being followed."3 This rationale has
also been adopted in cases concerning manufacturers' liability to third
Urschel, 101 Ind. App. 627, 200 N.E. 465 (1936). These cases were distinguished in
Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109 Ind. App. 693, 34 N.E.2d 943 (1941), and have been criticized
in 14 IiD. L.J. 379 (1939).
51. Though the utility company is liable, it may be indemnified by the driver who
negligently drove against the utility pole..
52. The real issue considered under the causation veil is and should be whether the
act was the factual cause of the injury. Because of the ambiguity of the term "proximate
cause" it is necessary to look behind the words to the actual consideration that was made.
See Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wilson, 226 Ind. 1, 77 N.E2d 580 (1948) ; Prest-O-Lite
Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365 (1914) ; King v. Inland Steel Co., 177 Ind. 201,
96 N.E. 337 (1911) ; Jones v. Furlong, 121 Ind. App. 279, 97 N.E.2d 369 (1951).
When a violation of the statute causes harm to the interests and class of persons
protected, liability is incurred. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89
N.E.2d 905 (1950) ; Winder & Son v. Blaine, 218 Ind. 68, 29 N.E.2d 987 (1940).
Where the violation does not injure a protected interest there is no liability. Nickey
v. Steuder, 164 Ind. 189, 73 N.E. 117 (1905) ; Greencastle v. Martin, 74 Ind. 449 (1881).
In the Steuder case, the defendant violated a statute prohibiting employment of any
child under fourteen years of age. The child was injured by the negligent act of a cus-
tomer. The court held the negligence of the employer was not the proximate cause of
the injury for a reasonable man could not have foreseen the child would be injured by
the act of an independent, responsible human agency. This seems to be a narrow inter-
pretation of the interests protected by the statute. The purpose of such a statute is to
protect children from the dangers of such employment. Negligence of third parties on
the employer's premises is one of those dangers. Violation of the statutory duty was the
factual cause of the injury because, but for the illegal employment of the child, the injury
would not have occurred.
53. When there is an injury resulting from an omission of a statutory duty, courts
hold such a violation to be negligence per se only as to those interests protected by the
statute. "It must be regarded as well settled doctrine, (1) that if one upon whom the
statute imposes a duty, violates that duty, and the violation results in injury, he is liable,
irrespective of all questions of care and prudence. . . ." Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182
Ind. 593, 600, 106 N.E. 365, 368 (1914). The negligence per se doctrine is limited in
Indiana to violations of statutes that require certain safety equipment. Northern Indiana
Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 172, 89 N.E.2d 905, 909 (1950).
"This is nothing more than the application of the risk theory to a special type of
negligence case." Foster, supra note 4, at 83. See Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391,
98 N.E.2d 896 (1951) ; Gerlot v. Swartz, 212 Ind. 292, 7 N.E.2d 960 (1937) ; Opple v.
Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1935).
Some difficulty is experienced in determining what interests the legislature sought
to protect by the statute. Kiste v. Red Cab, 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952) ;
Evansville Hoop and Stave Co. v. Bailey, 43 Ind. App. 153, 84 N.E. 549 (1908). This
last case virtually overruled an earlier interpretation of the same statute, though it said
the case was distinguishable on the facts. The earlier case, P.H. & F.M. Roots Co. v.
Meeker, 165 Ind. 132, 73 N.E. 253 (1905), restricted so narrowly the interest protected by
the statute as to render it ineffective.
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persons.54 The most recent statement of the Indiana law on this point was
made by a federal district court in Illinois.5" The judge reviewed the In-
diana holdings and concluded that liability should be based on the creation
of a substantial risk of harm rather than the kind of commodity that was
put into circulation. This rationale extends responsibility to the limits of
foreseeable risk-a highly desirable result.5"
Adoption of the risk theory in the fields of statutory negligence
and manufacturers' liability is an indication that the principle is susceptible
of application to Indiana negligence law. Furthermore, there are early
Indiana cases which clearly apply an embryonic risk analysis. In the first
and clearest of these,5" a tall brakeman was standing on an oversize
boxcar in a train passing beneath a sagging telegraph wire maintained
by the railroad. The brakeman struck the wire causing it to break and
wrap around a brake handle so that the loose end was swinging free.
The plaintiff's decedent was loading a flat car on a siding twenty-five
feet from the passing freight. The loose end of the wire swung out,
caught the decedent, and dragged him 125 feet causing injuries which
resulted in his death. At the outset, the opinion declared that the rail-
road owed no duty to the world at large but rather considered the duty
to be a relational matter between the parties.5" That is, the duty of the
railroad was not to harm a person within the risk created. Also, the in-
jury was not within the risk, for "[m] ischief, which could by no reason-
able possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would
have anticipated, cannot be taken into account as a basis upon which to
predicate a wrong."5 As to the foreseeability of the instant occurrence,
the court held that though there was a risk created, it was so slight as to
seem impossible-it was not an unreasonable risk of harm." Signifi-
cantly, the opinion did not indulge in the vagaries of proximate cause,
though such a fact situation presented a tempting opportunity. Rather,
a clear definition of the defendant's duty in relation to the plaintiff's
decedent was formulated and applied.6
54. Development in this field began in New York when a manufacturer was held
liable for failure to inspect an automobile wheel which was defective and later caused
injury to a third party. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
55. McCloud v. Leavitt Corp., 79 F.Supp. 286 (E.D. Ill. 1948). The Buick case was
specifically followed. Id. at 291.
56. See the discussion of the Buick case in Seavey, mipra note 24, at 376-381.
57. Wabash, St.L. & P. Ry. v. Locke, 112 Ind. 404, 14 N.E. 391 (1887).
58. Id. at 410, 14 N.E. at 394.
59. Id. at 413, 14 N.E. at 395.
60. Id. at 418, 14 N.E. at 398.
61. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583, 21 N.E. 968 (1889), also gives
careful attention to the duty owed by the defendant and the risk to be perceived. The
court then held that the negligence of the defendant would be deemed the proximate cause
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The risk theory requires a careful analysis of the duty, provides for
the application of significant public policy considerations, and affords
a convenient means for a clear, understandable instruction to the jury.
These advantages make Cardozo's approach not only desirable but neces-
sary to an intelligible explanation of the basis of determination in negli-
gence actions. Courts have employed the risk theory in decisions concern-
ing manufacturers' liability, statutorily imposed fault, and even in some
early common negligence cases. Judges have been applying the risk an-
alysis of duty under the foreseeability test of causation making them a
part of Indiana law; proximate cause language of these opinions serves
only to veil and confuse the critical issues. Since proper use of the risk
theory leaves nothing to be considered under the element of proximate
cause, the judiciary should abandon the language of the causation con-
cept and clearly adopt Judge Cardozo's rationale.
PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE PURCHASERS' INABILITY TO
BARGAIN OVER LIFE INSURANCE
Recent criticism of the insurance industry has not been aimed at
either the financial practices or management of the companies but rather
at the product sold, the insurance policy.' Basically this is due to a pre-
vailing dissatisfaction with certain results accruing when contract law is
applied to the policy.' The field of life insurance contains many examples
of these unsatisfactory results. Although each instance is a complete
problem in itself, they are, when viewed together, illustrative of the
larger issue.
The law of misrepresentation has an important position in present
day life insurance litigation. It owes its prominence, in a large sense, to
judicial and legislative dissatisfaction with the results obtained when the
strict common law doctrine of warranties was applied to life insurance
contracts.' Today, the statutes of most states provide that all statements
since the consequences were not unnatural. By the definition of the risks to be per-
ceived, the court answered the issue of proximate cause.
1. "Generally, the criticism which is aimed at insurance is not criticism with respect
to financial matters or management. It is criticism of the product which insurance com-
panies sell. . . . This condition of affairs has been developing for two hundred years or
more. It grows worse instead of better ... " Shaver, Pitfalls in Insurance Policies,
[1950] INS. LJ. 801, 802.
2. The policy of insurance is a contract between the parties and is governed by the
principles of contract law. 1 FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW oF INSURANCE §1 (5th
ed. 1952).
3. The application by the early courts of the strict doctrine of warranties to the life
insurance policy resulted in widespread hardships for the insured. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON
